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ABSTRACT
We investigate the antecedents of board cohesiveness in international joint ventures
(IJVs). Even though corporate governance scholars have frequently emphasized the crucial role
of cohesiveness for board effectiveness, cohesiveness has received limited systematic research
attention. IJVs are formed by two or more independent parent organizations originating from
different home countries with disparate cultural backgrounds. We argue that the inherent features
related to the international and partner-specific context of these organizational forms affect board
cohesiveness.
INTRODUCTION
International joint ventures are complex governance arrangements: they involve two or
more independent organizations with different national and cultural backgrounds that are
spanning geographic distances. The IJV board of directors plays a crucial role in managing this
complexity, and needs to be a cohesive, integrated group to do this well (Barrick, Bradley,
Kristof-Brown & Colbert, 2007). Yet, we know little of what factors drive cohesiveness in
boards, and in particular in those of IJVs. The prime objective of this study is to explore the
international- as well as partner-specific antecedents of IJV board cohesiveness.
Board cohesiveness may affect directors’ board meeting attendance and the time they
spend on board activities such as collecting, exchanging, and discussing relevant information
(Zhu, Wang & Bart, 2016). It may also influence directors’ commitment to their monitoring and
resource provision roles (Withers, Corley & Hillman, 2012; Zhu & Yoshikawa, 2016).
Consequently, board cohesiveness may be considered a necessary condition for board task
performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Westphal & Bednar, 2005) given that cohesive teams
arguably have lower communication and coordination costs (Beal, Cohen, Burke & McLendon,
2003; Shaw, 1981; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O’Bannon, & Scully, 1994).
Whereas cohesiveness is an important asset for all types of boards, it is particularly
salient in international joint ventures because of the complex and ambiguous nature of the
board’s tasks. IJV boards face an inherent division of loyalties: individual board members are
expected to act in the interests of the IJV, while at the same time safeguarding their respective
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parent firms’ interests. This makes IJV boards almost conflict-laden by design (Hewitt, 2005; Li
& Hambrick, 2005; Singleton, 2017). The international dimension adds to this complexity. Based
on prior research, cohesiveness in IJV boards can be expected to be a function of international
antecedents as well as partner-specific determinants.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Research shows that cohesion has an important function in work groups: it increases
member satisfaction and commitment to the group and its tasks, and reduces turnover intentions
(O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). Cohesion in boards essentially reflects the “board’s
ability to continue working together” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 492). As such, cohesion also
contributes to task performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). More
cohesive teams have lower communication and coordination costs (Beal et al., 2003; Shaw,
1981; Smith et al., 1994), and members are more willing to subjugate individual interests for
team goals (Harrison, Price, Gavin & Florey, 2002).
Despite its importance, IJV boards face several challenges in achieving high levels of
cohesion. First, due to the episodic nature of their meetings, many boards can face ‘process
losses’ (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) which hinder smooth interactions among board members and,
consequently, affect the board’s cohesion and effectiveness (Boivie et al., 2016). Moreover, IJV
partners and board members differ in terms of organizational affiliation, nationality, culture,
ethnicity, and professional background. Research points out that greater diversity among
individuals in teams can negatively affect group cohesion (Boivie et al., 2016; Harrison, Price &
Bell, 1998; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Milliken & Martins, 1996; O’Reilly et al., 1989; Smith et
al., 1994; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).
IJV boards have several unique characteristics that distinguish them from conventional
corporate boards. First, IJV boards and IJV directors are involved in a broader range of tasks and
roles. Besides principal-agent problems (i.e., differences of interests between shareholders and
management), IJV boards also face principal-principal challenges (i.e., parent firms vis-à-vis IJV
management). As a result, in addition to performing the same monitoring and service roles as
conventional corporate boards, they also serve as platforms for partners to align their interests
and solve potential conflicts (Hewitt, 2005; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). Second, IJV boards are part
of de novo organizations. This means that boards are newly formed groups of directors which
often do not share a history or interpersonal relationships. A final, crucial characteristic of IJV
boards is their inherent factional nature. Unlike corporate boards where directors represent the
same company, IJV boards are composed of groups of members that represent two or more
different partner organizations. Subgroups based on company membership are likely to act as
faultlines (Lau & Murnighan, 1998), which can lead to lower team identification, conflict, and
distrust among members, contributing to lower social cohesion and poorer performance (Li &
Hambrick, 2005).
International antecedents of IJV board cohesiveness
Cultural diversity. A first group of antecedents of IJV board cohesiveness is related to the
international nature of these partnerships. One source is the cultural diversity among the partner
firms involved in the joint venture. Greater cultural diversity among IJV partners will increase
the likelihood that board members hold substantially different expectations about the
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accountability and responsibility of the board, the importance of delegation and control, as well
as information sharing and decision-making practices (Bamford, 2016; Griffin, Guedhami,
Kwok, Li & Shao, 2017; Licht & Adams, 2019). Cultural values influence perceptions and
response preferences (Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000). Moreover, cultural identity is a strong
source of identification and categorization (Salk & Brannen, 2000; Salk & Shenkar, 2001).
Social identity theory suggests that the existence of culturally identifiable groups leads to the
categorization of people into insiders and outsiders. Outgroup members are seen by members of
ingroups as less trustworthy, capable, and cooperative than members of the ingroup (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Additionally, similarity-attraction theory suggests that individuals like, trust, and
interact more with persons who are like them in terms of nationality, values, beliefs, and attitudes
(Byrne, 1961; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). Because national identities of IJV directors often coincide
with their organizational affiliations, organizational faultlines among directors will be further
deepened by cultural faultlines.
In sum, stronger cultural diversity between IJV partners will increase cooperation
challenges between partner firms (Li & Hambrick, 2005; Salk & Shenkar, 2001), and
consequently, lower the cohesiveness among board members. Hence, we expect:
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between cultural
diversity between the parent companies in IJVs and board cohesiveness.
Geographic distance. Another fundamental characteristic of IJVs is their geographic
span. Geographic distance increases the interaction, communication, and coordination difficulties
between individuals, teams, and organizations (Baaij & Slangen, 2013). For example, Boeh and
Beamish (2015) argue that the time required to travel between geographically separated locations
harms performance of both wholly owned and joint venture subsidiaries, because of lower
information sharing and lower trust between head office and subsidiary. Similarly, Reuer &
Lahiri (2013) argue that the likelihood of alliance formation decreases with greater geographic
distance due to greater information asymmetries.
Geographic separation may also affect board cohesiveness in international joint ventures.
Greater distance involves more travel time and hassles (Schotter & Beamish, 2014; Boeh &
Beamish, 2015), which may result in fewer and shorter meetings, as well as an increased
preference to replace face-to-face meetings with other means of communication such as video
conferencing and phone calls. More importantly, research shows that spatial co-location is an
important facilitating condition for the development of trust and knowledge flows across
organizational boundaries (Bell & Zaheer, 2007). Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between geographic
distance between IJV partners and the joint venture and board cohesiveness.
Partner-specific antecedents of board cohesiveness
Multi-party IJVs. A second group of antecedents driving IJV board diversity and
cohesion reflects the fact that joint ventures bring together two or more partners that are
themselves independent organizations. A key characteristic is the number of foreign partners
involved in the international joint venture. The number of IJV partners will drive the diversity in
director representatives, and to some extent, also the size of the board. Multi-party IJVs are
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considered more difficult to govern because the higher number of intra- and inter-partner firm
relations causes coordination and communication challenges (Garcia-Canal, Valdes-Llaneza, &
Ariño, 2003; Killing, 1983). It also increases the likelihood of strategic misalignment (Gong,
Shenkar, Luo, & Nyaw, 2007) and opportunistic behavior (Garcia-Canal et al., 2003). In line
with these arguments, researchers found that IJVs with more partners are characterized by more
cooperation challenges and lower short-term performance (Garcia-Canal et al., 2003; Gong et al.,
2007), as well as lower survival rates (Chung & Beamish, 2012).
As mentioned, a distinctive feature of IJV boards is their coalitional nature and the dual
role of their members (Singleton, 2017). Board members can face opposing pressures regarding
serving the interests of the joint venture while also acting in the best interests of the parent
company that appointed them on the other hand (Bamford & Ernst, 2005; Hewitt, 2005; Zhu &
Yoshikawa, 2016). These pressures tend to be more conflicting when multiple partners are
involved given that their interests are more likely to diverge (Gong, et al., 2007) The diversity in
interests represented on the board may therefore work as a divisive element. Given that the
variety of parent company interests is higher in multi-party joint ventures than in dyadic joint
ventures, we expect that board cohesiveness will be lower in multi-party joint ventures. Thus, we
expect:
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the number of
IJV partners and board cohesiveness.
Business relatedness. A second partner-specific feature of international joint ventures is
the similarity or dissimilarity among parent companies in terms of knowledge, resources, and
capabilities which is typically a result of the reasons for their formation (Balakrishnan & Koza,
1993; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). Diversity of knowledge makes
it attractive for a firm to team up with other international firms, but creates integration and
assimilation difficulties (Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist & Marsh, 2006). As with national cultural
diversity, greater diversity in business backgrounds among directors may also lower the odds of
developing a strong, cohesive board. At the board level, having a common frame of reference, a
shared language, and similar cognitive structures will enable directors to communicate and
develop trusting relationships with each other (Keil, Maula, Schildt & Zahra, 2008; Lane &
Lubatkin, 1998). Differences in human capital (e.g., education), social capital (e.g., social
relations) and cognitions (e.g., beliefs and mental models) among directors will likely further
reinforce social categorization processes and faultlines based on cultural diversity and
geographic distance. Therefore, we expect:
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between business
relatedness among the IJV partners and board cohesiveness.
RESEARCH METHODS
Sample and data
For the measurement of board cohesiveness, we relied on primary data which we
collected through a survey in 2014. For the measurement of our international antecedents, we

10.5465/AMBPP.2020.29

used secondary data sources. For partner-specific antecedents we used quasi-objective data
obtained from the survey. Our control variables are also survey-based.
We selected an initial population of 2,222 IJVs that were formed in the 2008 – 2014 time
period across 126 countries. Our sample was focused on senior executives of mostly European
firms with IJV experience, either by means of establishing, managing, or overseeing them. We
circulated a total of 961 questionnaires, of which 169 were returned (17.6% response rate). Our
final sample consisted of 112 IJVs located in 35 different countries.
To the extent that there are significant difficulties in identifying potential respondents in
IJVs, along with the high staff turnover, the confidentiality of information, and the small size of
many IJVs, we were forced to adopt a single, key informant approach. Survey research on
strategic collaborations and board processes often relies on this approach given that it is usually
the only way to collect information (e.g., Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006; Kumar, Stern
& Anderson, 1993; Schreiner, Kale & Corsten, 2009; Zattoni, Gnan, & Huse 2015). We followed
Campbell’s (1955) suggestions to mitigate its downsides.
Based on several control mechanisms as well as post-hoc analyses, our findings appeared
not to be subject to common method bias or late respondent bias (Armstrong & Overton, 1977;
Harman, 1967; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). We also tested for
independence and discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
Variables and measurement
Dependent variable. For board cohesiveness, we used a 5-item survey instrument
developed in prior research (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; O’Reilly et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1994)
and adapted it to the IJV board setting (α = 0.89).
Independent variables. Cultural diversity among IJV partners is often measured using the
average cultural distance between the parent firms’ home countries (e.g., Reuer et al., 2014).
Because these cultural distance measures have received considerable criticism (e.g., Shenkar,
2001; Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & Roth, 2017), we use Ronen & Shenkar’s (2013) synthesis on
cultural clusters as a basis for our measure of cultural diversity (hypothesis 1a). In supplemental
analysis, we explored the robustness of this measure by comparing it with more traditional
distance measures.
To construct a measure for hypothesis 1b, we used data from the CEPII database.
Geographic distance (hypothesis 1b) was calculated by using the Great Circle distance formula
between the capitals of the country of origin of the partners and the IJV host country.
As for our partner-specific antecedents, we constructed a dummy variable to capture
whether the IJV had more than two partners (hypothesis 2a). The variable holds a value of 0 for
two party deals, and 1 if more than two partners are involved.
Finally, to test hypothesis 2b, we used a survey measure asking respondents to identify
the industries of all joint venture partners using a pre-specified list of industries (c.f. Reuer,
Klijn, & Lioukas, 2014). We created a dummy variable, assigning a score of 1 when IJV partner
firms operated in the same industry, and 0 if at least one of the partner firms did not operate in
the same industry.
Control variables. We controlled for IJV size and age, the presence of IJV
subcommittees, the annual number of board meetings, the proportion of insiders within the
board, and the number of board members. Furthermore, we included two measures to capture
alternative governance instruments that partners may implement in their IJV: prior ties and

10.5465/AMBPP.2020.29

contractual complexity (Parkhe, 1993). We also controlled for nationality diversity (Blau, 1977)
and environmental uncertainty in the host country (Reuer et al., 2014).
RESULTS
Our first set of hypotheses considers two international antecedents of IJV board
cohesiveness. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, cultural diversity between IJV partners is
significantly and negatively related to IJV board cohesiveness (β = -0.472, p = 0.047). Our
second hypothesis (1b) is concerned with the effect of geographic distance between partners’
home countries and the IJV host country on board cohesiveness. Contrary to what we
hypothesized, the coefficient estimate for geographic distance is positive and strongly significant
(β = 0.115, p = 0.001). H1b is therefore rejected, and in the discussion section we interpret this
finding and its implications.
The second set of hypotheses focuses on partnership-specific antecedents of board
cohesiveness. Hypothesis 2a, suggesting a negative relationship between the number of IJV
partners and board cohesiveness, was supported (β = -0.324, p = 0.022). Consistent with our final
hypothesis (2b), business relatedness among the IJV partners is significantly and positively
related to board cohesiveness (β = 0.249, p = 0.009). We conducted several supplemental
analyses to ascertain the robustness of our findings.
DISCUSSION
This study makes several contributions to the alliance governance literature, and to
corporate governance research on board processes more generally. First, this study addresses a
central question in board research why some boards are more effective than others. Whereas
there is broad consensus about the need to pay more attention to board dynamics, the research on
whether and how boards work together effectively remains scant (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zhu
et al., 2016). Board processes are often inferred from proxies such as average team tenure and
team heterogeneity (e.g., Michel & Hambrick, 1992), but are seldomly directly investigated. The
lack of cohesion in boards is seen as an important potential reason why larger boards tend to be
less effective than smaller boards, or why board meeting frequency has a negative effect on firm
performance (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016), but systematic evidence on board
cohesion and its antecedents is lacking.
This paper also advances an emerging stream of research on IJV boards. While the
importance of IJV boards for joint venture performance has long been acknowledged (Killing,
1983; Kriger, 1988; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Leksell & Lindgren, 1982), their role in the formal
governance of IJVs has not been a topic of much theoretical development and empirical research
(Reuer & Klijn, 2018). Board processes have been “black boxed”, even though the cohesiveness
of IJV boards might be critical to their effectiveness (Li & Hambrick, 2005).
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